Artificial Intelligence is set to influence every aspect of our lives, not least the way production is organized. AI, as a technology platform, can automate tasks previously performed by labor or create new tasks and activities in which humans can be productively employed.
Arti…cial Intelligence (AI) is one of the most promising technologies currently being developed and deployed. Broadly speaking, AI refers to the study and development of "intelligent (machine) agents", which are machines, softwares or algorithms that act intelligently by recognizing and responding to their environment. 1 There is a lot of excitement, some hype, and a fair bit of apprehension about what AI will mean for our security, society and economy.
But a critical question has been largely overlooked: are we investing in the "right" type of AI, the type with the greatest potential for raising productivity and generating broad-based prosperity? We don't have a de…nitive answer right now -nobody does. But this is the right time to ask this question while we can still shape the direction of AI research and the future of work.
AI As a Technology Platform
Human (or natural) intelligence comprises several di¤erent types of mental activities. These include simple computation, data processing, pattern recognition, prediction, various types of problem solving, judgment, creativity, and communication. Early AI, pioneered in the 1950s by researchers from computer science, psychology and economics, such as Marvin Minsky, Seymour Papert, John McCarthy, Herbert Simon and Allen Newell, sought to develop machine intelligence capable of performing all of these di¤erent types of mental activities.
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The goal was nothing short of creating truly intelligent machines. Herbert Simon and Allen
Newell, for example, claimed in 1958 "there are now in the world machines that think, that learn and that create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until -in a visible future -the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied." 3 These ambitious goals were soon dashed. AI came back into fashion in the 1990s, but with a di¤erent and more modest ambition: to replicate and then improve upon human intelligence in pattern recognition and prediction (pre-AI computers were already better than humans in computation and data processing). Many decision problems and activities we routinely engage in can be viewed as examples of pattern recognition and prediction. These include recognizing faces (from visual data), recognizing speech (from auditory data), recognizing abstract patterns in data we are presented with, and making decisions on the basis of past experience and current information. Though there are researchers working on "Arti…cial
General Intelligence", much of the research and almost all commercial applications of AI are in these more modest domains referred to as "Narrow AI"-even if the relevant applications 1 See Russell and Norvig (2009), Neapolitan and Jiang (2018) and Agarwal, Gans and Goldfarb (2018) . 2 See Nilsson (2009) for the history of AI. 3 Forester (1985, p. 86 added (because they increase productivity by more than wages and employment). They may also reduce overall labor demand because they displace workers from the tasks they were previously performing. There are countervailing e¤ects to be sure: some of the productivity gains may translate into greater demand for labor in non-automated tasks and in other sectors. But even with these e¤ects factored in, automation always reduces the labor share in value added.
This discussion clari…es an important point: in an age of rapid automation, labor's relative standing will deteriorate and workers will be particularly badly a¤ected if new technologies are not raising productivity su¢ ciently -if these new technologies are not great but just "so-so"(just good enough to be adopted but not so much more productive than the labor they are replacing). With so-so automation technologies, labor demand declines: the displacement is there, while powerful productivity gains contributing to labor demand are missing.
Is this far-fetched? Not really. We have previously studied the implications of one of the most important automation technologies, industrial robots. 7 Industrial robots are not technologies aimed at increasing labor's productivity but are designed to automate tasks that were previously performed by production workers on the factory ‡oor. The evidence is fairly clear that industries where more industrial robots are introduced experience declines in labor demand (especially for production workers) and sizable falls in their labor share.
More importantly, local labor markets more exposed to industrial robots, such as Detroit MI or De…ance OH, have signi…cantly lower employment and wage growth. Furthermore, the declines in wages and employment fell much more heavily on workers from the lower half of the earnings distribution and those with less than a college degree, thus exacerbating inequality. All of this is despite the fact that industry-level data also suggest productivity gains from robots.
Automation is not a recent phenomenon. Many important breakthroughs in the history of technology have been centered around automation. Most notably, the spectacular advances in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution in Britain were aimed at automating weaving and spinning, and the focus then shifted to the factory ‡oors of other industries. 8 Other prominent examples of automation are the mechanization of agriculture and the interchangeable parts system of American manufacturing.
But if automation tends to reduce the labor share and has mixed e¤ects on labor demand, why did the labor share remain roughly constant and productivity growth go hand-in-hand with commensurate wage growth over the last two centuries? To understand this relationship, we need to recognize di¤erent types of technological advances contributing to productivity growth. Historically, as automation technologies were being introduced, other technological advances simultaneously enabled the creation of new tasks in which labor had a competitive advantage. This generated new activities for labor -tasks in which human labor could be reinstated into the production process -and robustly contributed to productivity growth as new tasks improved the division of labor. 9 The episode of agricultural mechanization, which started in the second half of the 19th century, vividly illustrates this pattern. Though mechanization reduced the labor share and employment in agriculture, overall labor demand rose because a range of new tasks were introduced in both manufacturing and services. In fact, this period witnessed not only the rise of clerical occupations but a range of more specialized blue-collar and white-collar jobs that increased productivity, the demand for labor and the labor share in manufacturing and services. 10 Occupations featuring new tasks have been at the forefront of employment growth in the US economy in the postwar era as well.
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This perspective then suggests a di¤erent reinterpretation of the history of technology and a di¤erent way of thinking about the future of work -as a race between automation and new, labor-intensive tasks. Labor demand has not increased steadily over the last two centuries because of technologies that have made labor more productive in everything. Rather, many new technologies have sought to eliminate labor from tasks in which it previously specialized.
All the same, labor has bene…ted from advances in technology, because other technologies have simultaneously enabled the introduction of new labor-intensive tasks. These new tasks have done more than just reinstate labor as a central input into the production process; they have also played a vital role in productivity growth.
Viewed from this perspective, employment and wage growth have been disappointing over the last two decades partly because productivity growth has been weak, and even more importantly because new tasks have failed to materialize. 12 The future of work will be much brighter if we can mobilize more of the technologies that increase labor demand and ensure vigorous productivity growth.
Varieties of AI
This perspective provides a new way of thinking about the economic opportunities and challenges posed by AI. Most AI researchers and economists studying its consequences view it as a way of automating yet more tasks. No doubt, AI has this capability, and most of its applications to date have been of this mold -e.g., image recognition, speech recognition, translation, accounting, recommendation systems, and customer support. But we do not need to accept that this as the primary way that AI can be and indeed ought to be used.
First, if all we do is continue down the path of automation, with no counterbalancing innovations to generate new tasks, the implications for labor are depressing. It will not be the end of work anytime soon, 13 but the trend towards lower labor share and anemic growth in labor demand will continue -with potentially disastrous consequences for income inequality and social cohesion.
Second, as we go deeper and deeper into AI-based automation, we are moving into areas in which human labor is quite good (for example think of image and speech recognition or hand-eye coordination), and machine productivity, at least to start with, is not always impressive, to say the least. Automation technologies aimed at substituting machines for humans in these tasks are thus likely to be of the so-so kind. As a result, we cannot even count on powerful productivity gains to increase our living standards and contribute to labor demand.
But it doesn't have to be this way. Since AI is not just a narrow set of technologies with speci…c, pre-determined applications and functionalities but a technology platform, it can be deployed for much more than automation; it can be used to restructure the production process in a way that creates many new, high-productivity tasks for labor. If this type of "reinstating AI"is a possibility, there would be potentially large societal gains both in terms of improved productivity and greater labor demand (which will not only create more inclusive growth but also avoid the social problems created by joblessness and wage declines).
Consider a few examples of how AI applications can create new tasks for labor.
12 Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019) . 13 See Dreyfus (1992) and Autor (2015) .
Education: Education is one of the areas with the least AI penetration. That may be partly because automation is not an attractive or even feasible option for most of the core tasks in education. But using AI to create new tasks would be a di¤erent way of productively deploying this new technology platform. Consider, for example, classroom teaching. This has not changed for over 200 years. A teacher teaches to the whole class, even if he or she or an aide may occasionally engage in one-on-one instruction or provide help for some subset of students. There is evidence, however, suggesting that many students have di¤erent "learning styles", and what works for one student may not work for another, and even what works for one student in one subject will not work for him or her in every subject.
14 At the moment, individualized teaching, targeted and adapted to each student or for small subsets of students, is impossible, and not just because the resources in terms of teacher time and skill are lacking. It is mostly because nobody has the information (and cannot easily acquire and process the information) to determine a student's optimal learning style in a speci…c subject or topic. AI can change this. AI software can be designed to collect and process in real time data about the speci…c reactions, di¢ culties and successes students have in di¤erent subject areas, especially when taught in di¤erent styles, and then make recommendations for improved individualized teaching. The potential improvements in terms of educational productivity could be quite large (we just don't know). Societal bene…ts could exceed these direct bene…ts as AI-powered teaching methods may do better in terms of providing students with skills that will be more valued in future labor markets (rather than the more backward-looking curricula and teaching emphasis currently prevailing in schools). Developing and deploying such technologies would also increase the demand for human labor in teaching -we would need more teachers with diverse skills to do the individualized teaching, even with help from AI software and other technologies.
Healthcare: The situation in healthcare is similar. Though there has been more e¤ort to introduce digital technologies into healthcare, the focus has not been on creating tasks in which humans can be productively employed (in fact, some of the uses of AI, for example in radiology, are very much in the mold of automation). AI applications that collect and analyze information can signi…cantly empower nurses, technicians and other healthcare providers to o¤er a wider range of services and more real-time health advice, diagnosis and treatment. The bene…ts in terms of greater labor demand and productivity are very similar to the education case.
14 See Allport (1937) , Cassidy (2004) Honey and Mumford (1986) and Ramirez and Casteneda (1974) . interfaces in order to increase the ability of humans to perceive, monitor and control objects -might enable workers to work alongside machines and perform high precision production and integrated design tasks. This will not just help workers keep some of the tasks that might have otherwise been automated; it could also create new tasks in which humans, augmented by digital technology and sensors, can be employed and contribute to productivity. 
Why the Wrong Kind of AI?
If there are potentially productive and pro…table uses of AI beyond simple automation, can we count on market forces and innovation by existing companies to take us there? Is there any reason to worry that AI applications with the promise of reinstating human labor will not be exploited and resources will continue to pour instead into the wrong kind of AI?
Economists tend to place great trust in the market's ability to allocate resources in the most e¢ cient way. But most experts recognize that the market's star doesn't shine as brightly when it comes to innovation. There are several reasons for market failures in innovation in general, as well as some speci…c reasons that are important in the context of AI.
Innovation creates externalities -not just the innovator, but the workers that use the new technology, the …rms that adopt it, and most importantly other …rms and researchers building on it in the future will bene…t from it. Markets do not do a good job in the presence of such externalities.
Markets struggle when there are alternative, competing technological paradigms. When one paradigm is ahead of the other, both researchers and companies tend to follow that paradigm, even if an alternative could be more productive. Moreover, in such a situation, once the wrong paradigm pulls ahead, it may be very di¢ cult to reverse this trend and bene…t from the possibilities o¤ered by the alternative paradigm. To the extent that di¤erent approaches to AI constitute alternative, competing paradigms, our trust in the market mechanism getting it right should be even lower.
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To correct market failures in innovation, the US government has historically used public- 16 See Nelson and Winter (1977) , Dosi (1982) and Acemoglu (2012) . 17 Mazzucato (2015) .
human element from the production process. This last consideration may have become even more critical as the vast resources of several leading companies are pouring into academia and shaping the teaching and research missions of leading universities. It is then no surprise that the best minds in the current generation are gravitating towards computer science, AI and machine learning, but with a heavy emphasis on automa-
tion. An ecosystem that is biased would become much more sti ‡ing for the direction of technological change when it becomes all-encompassing.
There are also additional factors that may have distorted choices over what types of AI applications to develop. The …rst one is that if employment creation has a social value beyond what is in the GDP statistics (for example, because employed people are happier and become better citizens, or because faster growth in labor demand improves income inequality), this social value will be ignored by the market. The second is related to the tax policies adopted in the United States and other Western nations, which subsidize capital and investment while taxing employment. This makes using machines instead of labor more pro…table, and these pro…ts encourage not just automation but also automation research. Finally, and complementing these factors, to the extent that …rms take into account the cost of labor (the wage rate), which tends to be higher than the social opportunity cost of labor because of imperfections in the labor market, they Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018a) .
highlighting other barriers to the use of new technologies to create new tasks, the way that hospitals, insurance companies and the whole medical profession, as represented by the American Medical Association, is organized is likely to be in the way. If empowering, and increasing the productivity of, nurses and technicians is perceived to reduce the demand for the services of doctors or challenge the current business model of hospitals, it will be strenuously resisted.
All in all, even though we currently lack de…nitive evidence that research and corporate resources today are being directed towards the "wrong"kind of AI, the market for innovation gives no compelling reason to expect an e¢ cient balance between di¤erent types of AI. If at this critical juncture insu¢ cient attention is devoted to inventing and creating demand for, rather than just replacing, labor, that would be the "wrong"kind of AI from the social and economic point of view. Rather than undergirding productivity growth, employment and shared prosperity, rampant automation would contribute to anemic growth and inequality.
Conclusion
Arti…cial Intelligence is set to in ‡uence every aspect of our lives, not least the way production is organized in modern economies. But we shouldn't assume that, left to its own devices, the right types of AI will be developed and implemented. Though many today worry about the security risks and other unforeseen (often non-economic) consequences of AI, we have argued that there are prima facie reasons for worrying about the wrong kind of AI from an economic point of view becoming all the rage and the basis of future technological development. The considerable promise of AI implies that we need to devote care and serious thought to its implications and to the question of how best to develop this promising technology platform -before it is too late.
